

Change in the countryside of Morocco

the impact of French colonial intervention at the turn of the 19th/20th century

This article explores the extent of the changes that took place in the Moroccan countryside as a result of French colonial intervention at the beginning of the 20th century. Before the French protectorate (1912) the tribal system predominated in the Moroccan countryside. There existed a balance of power between the different social groups, such as the Sufi brotherhoods, religious scholars, the military and the bureaucracy, the sultan. The sultan was only the anchor point of this system, there did not exist a hierarchical power structure. With the increase of European commercial penetration after 1844 (battle of Isly) foreign control of Moroccan administration and finance also increased. Foreign loans were concluded making Morocco even more dependent on Europe. These developments culminated in the establishment of the French (and Spanish) protectorate. The establishment of the French protectorate had a devastating impact on tribal life. Tribal lands were made available for colonization at the expense of tribal groups. Land was made available for sale. The French also exploited the practice of Berber customary law, which existed among the Berber tribes. They gave formal recognition to tribal courts in certain matters, while matters regarding civil and criminal law remained in the hands of the government, who judged according to the sharia, thus provoking a system of dual jurisdiction.

Keywords: Morocco; tribes; rural change; French protectorate; Berbers; customary law.

Introduction

Preceding the French protectorate (1912 - 1956) most of the inhabitants of the countryside were peasants and tribesmen. The tribesmen of the Middle Atlas practiced semi-nomadism (transhumance, seasonal migration) alongside limited agriculture.

Severe changes have taken place in the countryside since the advent of French

protectorate (1912). To develop insight into the extent of these changes and into the ways these changes have affected the lifestyles and social organization in the countryside is the purpose of this article. First of all, the period preceding the French protectorate will be examined. In particular, the social and economic organization of the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas during the period 1860-1912. Secondly, the changes that have resulted from the political and economic penetration of the European powers, and especially of France, will be discussed. We will see that as a result of French policy the tribal organization underwent irreparable transformations which left many of the tribes as a landless proletariat.

The period from 1860 to 1912 witnessed three distinct sets of change. The first was the massive penetration of European goods and capital into local markets. The second was an internally generated modernization effort which resulted in the dismantling of the old administrative structure and the launching of a program of reforms. The third factor of change was set in motion by the French colonial offensive after 1900 (Burke, 1977: xii). The view of traditional Moroccan society and history has been dominated by French scholars. They have viewed Moroccan history within the framework of a struggle between the *makhzan* and the "anarchic" Berber tribes in the countryside, the *blad assiba* (country of resistance).¹ The *makhzan-siba* opposition, however is an oversimplification. In reality, there existed a symbiotic relationship between various segments of society, such as tribes, saintly families (*murabitin*), *zawiya-s* (Sufi brotherhoods), *ulama* (religious scholars), *shurafa* (descendants of the prophet) and urban guilds. Thus, Islamic orthodoxy existed alongside forms of heterodoxy, such as saint cults, Sufi brotherhoods and customary tribal law. Moreover, 'tribalism in its many variations was an integral part of the total Moroccan social and historical experience. (...) The tribal framework provided a viable and secure structure

for the recruitment and organization of groups, distribution of resources, and management of local conflicts' (Vinogradov, 1974: 7). The *siba* was never a fixed entity, but changed over time and place. And there has never existed a tribe that did not have some kind of relationship with the *makhzan*. According to Abdallah Laroui rural revolts were not directed to overthrow sultan or *makhzan*. Instead, they were a demand for participation. Moroccan society in the 19th century consisted of three systems, that were not hierarchically interrelated: tribe, *zawiya* and *makhzan* co-existed alongside each other. The sultan merely represented the anchor point of these partial systems, but he could not speak in their name (Laroui, 1993:232).

Tribal society before 1912

The Middle Atlas is the region of transhumance in Morocco. This involves seasonal movements between the summer and winter grounds.

Vinogradov describes the seasonal migration of the Ait Ndhir:

Beginning in September, and throughout October, animals were sent down from the high pastures and were put to eat the stubble from the harvest. In November, the rest of the animals and people followed. [...] By January, the douar's (settlements) had regrouped in their proper areas on the plain and the tribe became several agglomerations of tents scattered over the territory. Each large extended family was grouped into one sector, *rif*, separated by some distance from another such group. (Vinogradov, 1974: 46)

During warmer periods (March until September) the group moved again into the high areas. The adult men stayed behind (except in times of war) to prepare the ground for spring cultivation, where the bulk of the group would again return in September/October. So, the group and cattle would be in the high plains from around March until September. By June, the people and animals would have reached the

highest pastures and the tribe would be dispersed, the tents widely separated from one another. Men went down to the plain to harvest the wheat and barley; part of the crop was taken back for immediate consumption but the bulk was stored in underground bins called *mars* (Arabic: *matamer*), along with honey and wool. At the same time the ground was prepared for the summer crops, sorghum and maize, which were to be harvested in August and September. Toward the end of September the animals started to descend and were put to eat the stubble from the harvest. In October and before the rains started, men began to prepare the ground for the following year's fields. By November, everyone was down on the lowlands and the tents had regrouped in their original camp units (Vinogradov, 1974: 47).

Socio-political organization

Closely related to their (semi-)nomadic life is the social organization of the tribes.

According to Robert Montagne, the Berber tribes were organized in a mosaic of small independent and autonomous republics or cantons (*taqbilt-s*). Daily life within the canton was characterized by endemic feuding. To counterbalance conflict and feuding within the cantons Montagne believed the alliance (*leff*) system to be essential: "each segment within the *taqbilt* (tribe) was incorporated into one or the other of two major alliances that prevailed over all the Western High Atlas mountains" (Vinogradov, 1974: 52). So, alliances were made across tribal borders (Hoffman, 1967: 105). Alliances take place in pairs, resulting in an overall division of the region in two halves (*omnasf-s*). The whole region (consisting of many tribes) looked like a big checkerboard of alliances, limiting the power of the Berber chiefs: a booty gained in war had to be shared with all the partners in the *leff*. To gain real power a chief had to dominate the two halves.

The leagues get mobilized when a conflict between two chiefs seems to get out of hand. The struggle between two chiefs of opposing *leff*-s occurs as follows. Firstly the chief will try to mobilize the patrilineages in his own territorial community who have recognized his authority. Then one of his men will climb a hill and will wave a white flag in a certain manner, so his allies know that there is a fight coming on. His adversary will do the same. One or two days later a large number of armed men will reach the territory of the two opposing chiefs. The two camps will prepare for battle in a festive way. Some shots will be fired, one or two men may be killed, but then the *shurafa* (descendants of the prophet, holy men) will intervene and force an agreement between the two parties. The intervention of the *leff*-s thus prevents a massacre between two lineages of the same community (Jamous, 1981: 165).

The chessboard alliance model of Montagne has been criticized among others by David Hart. According to him, Montagne made the mistake to integrate the independent and separate networks of alliance and hostility into two overall ones. Besides that he assumed these networks to be permanent (Hart, 1996: 198).

Another theory put forward to explain the social organization of the tribes is that of 'segmentary opposition'. Segmentation theory presupposes that tribal groups get divided through time and space. Tribes are divided in segments or clans of kinsmen, who are genealogically related. Each of these sections are again subdivided into subsections and sub clans. And so on, until the level of the nuclear family. Groups of closely related kinsmen unite against groups of more distant related kinsmen. But these two opposing groups unite when threatened by groups of a higher genealogical level, also related to them. Endless feuding takes place 'and it can be, and has been, argued

that feuds and wars, far from promoting disintegration of the tribal system, provided in fact the main force and impetus which kept it going' (Hart, 1999: 12).

The Ait Ndhir identify themselves as a *taqbilt* (tribe), because they share a common dialect, area and customs. In fact, they consider the *taqbilt* a super-confederation. In daily life the primary *ighs* (meaning: 'bone') and de *tigemmi* are more important. There are 10 primary segments within the *taqbilt* and these carry separate names and can be territorially localized.

The *ighs* and *tigemmi* correspond to the physical groups, who live together and share collective ownership of the land.

It has been argued that segmentation theory represents a model, not a description of reality (Burke: 8). In fact, the social organization of a number of tribes reflected more the residence patterns than genealogical relationships. The Bni Bataw, an Arab tribe from the plains of western Morocco near the foothills of the Middle Atlas use the concept of 'closeness' to refer to tribal segments. This can imply genealogical closeness, but can also refer to cooperation with nearby households, mutual herding arrangements and patronage relations (Eickelman: 93). Besides the segmentary and alliance systems there also exist pacts based on brotherhood or protection. One of such was the *tada*. These pacts guaranteed hospitality among the communities. These pacts were necessary for outsiders to pass through tribal country.

Vinogradov has argued that both the tribal segmentary structure and the alliance structure (*leff*) can very well co-exist. In fact, 'individual *tigemmi*-s, the basic socio-economic units, were embedded in a network of alliances, both economic and political' (Vinogradov, 1974: 91). The *tigemmi* is a minor lineage and corresponds to a village or village segment.

Tribal councils

Socio-political tribal life in the late 19th century was dominated by customary law (*'urf*) and the tribal councils (sing.: *jama'a*). Most of the basic units of social organization have their council of senior notables. So, the *jama'a* of the minor lineages are composed of the heads of each family or tent. Representatives of the minor lineage participate in the *jama'a* of the major lineage. Representatives of the major lineage participate in the *jama'a* of the district and representatives of this council finally participate in the *jama'a* of the tribe.² The councils deal exclusively with executive, legislative and judicial functions. Among their functions are enforcing customary law, external relations and warfare; administration of communal institutions, such as mosques, saints' tombs, Qur'an-school, cemetery, irrigation system. The *jama'a* also distributes water according to the local pattern of water rights; administers and distributes communal lands both for purposes of agriculture and grazing; fixes the schedule for agricultural operations or nomadic or transhumant migration (Hoffman, 1967: 88).

Abdallah Laroui: the socio-political system as a balance of powers

The Moroccan historian Adallah laroui has put forward another picture of Moroccan society in the 19th century. According to him there didn't exist a hierarchical social structure culminating in the position of the sultan. Different social groups existed besides each other. To name the most important: the *shurafa* (descendants of the prophet), the Sufi brotherhoods (*zawiya*-s), the religious scholars (*'ulama* and *fuqaha*), the military and bureaucracy (*makhzan*), the tribes and the professional corporations (guilds).³ All the different groups have some kind of relationship to the sultan and only via the sultan do they recognize each other. The sultan is the anchor point of the whole system. According to Laroui, the sultan has five aspects. He is both a *sharif* (descendant of the prophet, with it comes religious prestige) and an *imam* (he maintains the

supremacy of the Islamic law, *sharʿ*). The sultan is also the commander of the army. During his many expeditions (*mahalla*'s) he forms coalitions with some groups against other groups.⁴ He is also the head of some sort of administration (*makhzan*). The *makhzan* consists of ministers (*wuzara*, sing.: *wazir*), clerks, servants of the palace etc. Lastly, he is also a master (*mawlay*). He expects complete submission of his subjects. Ministers, secretaries, soldiers etc. receive an allowance for their loyalty, not a work salary. In return they receive the right to practice their religious duties, according to Laroui.⁵ It is the duty of the *imam* (sultan) to maintain the celebration of the cult. Thereby, the sultan also guarantees safety, because the absence of safety makes the celebration of the cult impossible.

All these aspects of the sultan are related to the different social groups. The *ʿulama* only recognize the sultan as imam and commander of the army. *Shurafa* and brotherhoods acknowledge the *sharaf*-aspect (the sultan as descendant of the prophet). Soldiers and clerks acknowledge the sultan as master etc.

This whole social system, in which different groups co-exist alongside each other and only recognize each other than via the sultan is reinforced by a social contract (*bayʿa*) when a new sultan is inaugurated. Each community (above all the *ʿulama* of Fes), each tribe, village, town draws up a *bayʿa*. Being without a sultan is not an option, because he represents the Islamic community, religion and law. Speed is necessary to achieve a new consensus.

So far, I have described the tribal and socio-political situation as it existed prior to the protectorate. Collective ownership of the land and the right to defend it, seasonal migrations (transhumance) and an egalitarian political system that operated via councils of notables were essential elements of the life of the Berber tribes. Moreover, tribal life was closely connected with other groups and other spheres of life. The sacred (*zawiya*,

shurafa), the religious (*shar'*, mosque, *qadi*), the political (governor, *qa'id*), the military (*guich*, tribesmen) and of course the tribal (customary law, councils) are always present in the nineteenth century.⁶ This situation drastically changed with the installation of the protectorate.

Political history prior to the French protectorate

In order to understand the changes that took place in the countryside in the period under consideration I will firstly consider the political developments that led to the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates.

Morocco witnessed several wars against European powers in the nineteenth century, wight it all lost: the battle at Isly against the French (1844) and the Tetouan wars against the Spanish (1859-60). After the battle at Isly, European commercial penetration began to increase and the financial situation of the *makhzan* became precarious. After the Tetouan wars Morocco had to pay an indemnity of 100 million pesetas to Spain. 'As a result the Moroccan treasury was drained of its gold and silver reserves, and a large share of the customs receipts (the principal source of foreign exchange revenue) was earmarked for twenty-five years to pay the cost of the indemnity demanded by the Spanish' (Burke, 1976: 21). A monetary crisis followed which disturbed the traditional economy forever. The defeats by the French and the Spanish (a minor force by European standards) also marked the beginning of a call for military reforms. Attempts were made at administrative reforms by a new and younger *makhzan*, with British backing. But these met with severe rural opposition, notably from the *guish* tribes, the sufi brotherhoods, the *shurafa* (descendants of the prophet) and protégés of the European powers (mainly in or nearby the ports, where European penetration was most marked). These groups were until then traditionally tax-exempt. 'By not first seeking to win the support of the powers, the reformers made a serious mistake. This

they had further compounded by not first explaining the reforms to the tribes and soliciting a recommendation from the *'ulama'* (Burke, 1976: 53). By 1902 Morocco had built up such debts that a foreign loan became necessary, thus pushing the government to even more dependency on foreign capital. The loan went to the French and 'this first loan was regarded by the French banks and the Quai d'Orsay as the opening wedge of a long-term process which would eventually place the Moroccan treasury completely in the hands of French finance' (Burke, 1976: 56).

There were two events, in fact international conferences on Morocco in 1904 (Madrid) and 1906 (Algeiras), that were to shape the future of the country. The first was the Madrid convention of 1904, where an entente cordiale between France and Great Britain was established: France agreed to renounce her latent claims to Egypt and received in return freedom of action in Morocco. This became known as the Cambon-Lansdowne agreement. When this news became known to the Moroccans they felt betrayed by the British.

In 1906 an international conference about the reform of the Moroccan system convened in Algeiras. Although initially against the will of France it turned out a complete victory for the French. A special port police force (to protect the European residents) and a state bank were formed. The state bank was dominated by representatives of the consortium headed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. It became the sole financial agent of the Moroccan government. As a result, the Moroccan government became the virtual prisoner of the Paris banking consortium. Sultan Abd al-Aziz was accused of total surrender to the 'Christians'.

Thereafter, popular resistance against the French grew quickly and turned into a real jihad in 1907. Abd al-al-Hafiz joined forces against his brother, the ruling sultan Abd al-Aziz, in a civil war which lasted a year. He was proclaimed sultan by the *'ulama*

of Marrakech and later, and more important, by the *'ulama* of Fes. But as long as he did not sign the Algeciras convention he was not acknowledged by the powers as sultan of Morocco. Initially identified with a program of jihad, Abd al-Hafiz was compelled to accept the Algeciras convention and eventually French financial and military aid. On May 4, 1910 he ratified the accord with Paris, which was very much in the favor of France. It meant a total capitulation by the sultan like his brother had suffered in 1906. (Cambon-Landsowne agreement). After the signing, a new loan to Morocco was considered. And payments due on the outstanding loans and indemnities were rigorously deducted. 'Whatever financial autonomy Morocco still possessed was eliminated by the conclusion of the loan agreement' (Burke, 1976: 144). The tribes in particular were very much opposed to French military penetration and the centralizing *makhzan*, but also to the powerful families of al-Glawi and al-Muqri who supported the *makhzan* with their military power and who were given important positions in the *makhzan*. As a consequence, the tribes of the district round Fes and Meknes revolted under the leadership of the tribe of the Ait Ndhir (1911). On March 11 the Ait Ndhir and their allies proceeded to Fes and laid siege to the town. However, the French sent reinforcements of 8000 men and crushed the rebellion.

The protectorate followed in 1912. It was established by the treaty of Fes. It was more of an international agreement (following the Agadir crisis of July 1911) than something between France and Morocco.⁷ The sultan signed the treaty without much resistance. Moroccan officials retained only symbolic authority. The French resident-general now assumed all control over the foreign relations of the country. 'The treaty of Fez, in sum, emptied the authority of the sultan and the *makhzan* of all substance and created alongside their authority a highly ramified protectorate government with complete control in all the areas which counted' (Burke, 1976: 181 - 182).

The French Protectorate

French colonial rule: la politique Berbère

The French regarded the Arabs as fanatics. The Berbers were regarded as more civilized and their attachment to Islam as only superficial. French politics aimed 'to weaken the political and religious authority of the sultan and remove religious law from rural societies in favor of European-style justice and later French code law' (Guerin 2011: 363). In short, the French wanted to isolate the Berbers from the Muslim Arabs. In order to realize this, attempts were undertaken to reform Berber customary law in the French image. In the *dahir* (decree by the sultan) of 1914 it says that the Berbers have the right to adjudicate matters of collective land ownership, succession, inheritance and personal status through customary law. Jurisdiction over civil and criminal law remained in the hands of *makhzan* officials who judged according to the *sharia*. As all *dahir*-s, this *dahir* was signed by the sultan. In 1915 the Direction des Affaires Indigènes (DAI) organized a test-run for a new *jama'a* with expanded judicial powers in the Gerrouan region. This new body carried jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters based on local custom, independent of the *makhzan* and *shari'a*. But, the northern region of Guerrouane remained under the jurisdiction of the *makhzan* court system, while the south included both a *shari'a* court and a customary tribunal. So, it became extremely difficult to determine which court had jurisdiction, as travel among the two regions was frequent. Lyautey, the French résident général, did not notify the sultan or the *makhzan*, 'as the act blatantly disregarded the sultan's authority over his subjects and abrogated many of the religious protections guaranteed by the treaty of Fes' (Guerin 2011: 369). There was immediate protest, but the DAI went further and created in 1915 a *jama'a* judiciaire to encompass all rural areas to judge questions of personal statute, inheritance and property disputes. A French contrôleur presided the council (Guérin 2011: 370).

The DAI also changed the official language of the customary courts from Arabic into French. This was ‘a calculated move to distance the rural populations from Arab influence and to marginalize the Arabic-speaking *makhzan* officials while progressively integrating French cultural and institutional norms into the administration’ (Guerin 2011: 370). Moreover, the customary laws were unified and written down in French. In these ways the French were able to undermine the balance between the tribes and the *makhzan*. By ‘adapting’ the existing traditional tribal system the French sought to avoid direct colonial rule. At the same time, traditional customs were emptied of all substance. For instance, the *jama`a* of the clan was reduced ‘to serve as an intermediary body between the protectorate and the tribe’ (Vinogradov 1974: 102). Despite the *politique Berbère*, the Berber tribes underwent influences of Arabization, due to the increase of Arab urban merchants. The result was detribalization (Op. Cit.: 103, 104).

In 1930, French opinion moved to direct rule instead of rule via the tribal councils. The *dahir* of 1930 introduced the French criminal code in the provinces. In this way, the French removed all aspects of *shari`a* from the countryside and Berber justice was reorganized in a clearly French fashion (Guerin 2011: 372). The *dahir* of 1930 gave rise to heavy protests and led to the establishment of the first political parties and the nationalist movement.

Effects of French rule on tribal organization

‘Article 11 of the convention of Madrid (1904) and article 60 of the act of Algeciras (1906) made it possible for Europeans to acquire property in Morocco. Land speculation and sale reached such scandalous proportions that the government was forced to find means of preventing the wholesale dispossession of tribal groups’ (Vinogradov, 1974:93). French immigrants were hungry for land after World War I. The French sought means to confine the tribes to a part of their land, making the remaining land

available for colonization. Their aim was to make the collectively owned (tribal) lands available for sale. A massive bulk of 'legal' means pertaining to the classification and definition of the land ownership system was produced between 1919 and 1925 by French jurists. The result was the gradual overtake of the best lands, not only by brutal force, but also by sale. An accompanying factor was that there was more demand for islamic private property, *milk* (Bouderbala 2005: 329).

The efforts of the jurists culminated in the *dahir* of April 27, 1919. Its main points are:

- Collective land is land belonging to a douar (settlement), clan or tribe. But: the state had the right to expropriation if it deemed this necessary for the public interest.
- The jama'a of the clan was recognized officially. But: their duties were set down in writing and their members were elected for a period of 3 years. They could delegate their authorities to a representative (na'ib), who had to be approved by the qa'id, an official in the service of the sultan.
- The supervision and administration of the collective property was placed under the tutelage of the Director of Native Affairs (Direction des Affaires Indigènes, DAI). A council was established to administer the land. But, the council was presided by a French Magistrate assisted by two notables for each tribe (appointed by the grand Vizier) and the council was given the authority to overrule the tribal jama'a (Vinogradov, 1974: 95).

It was this decree that paved the way for the dislocation of collective land from tribal land. In principle collective land was now for sale on the market. The tribes were

heavily affected by the sale of land to French immigrants and the best parts of their lands were made available (at a reduced price) for French families.

Moreover, the tribes were intimidated by the presence of the French army, that was pressing them into *corvée*-labour to clear roads and work on European farms. At least, this is true for the tribes of the Middle Atlas. Consequently, the Ait Ndhir were quickly losing their homelands in favor of the colons who were slowly acquiring more land. 'By 1924, 30.000 ha on the plain were owned by private colons' (Vinogradov, 1974: 97).

Conclusion

In the nineteenth century, rural life was dominated by the interplay of tribes, peasants, *zawiya*'s, *shurafa*, and military incursions by the *makhzan* and neighbouring groups. Socio-political life of the tribes was dominated by customary law, which was enforced by tribal councils. Land was collectively owned. There was hardly any privately owned property, except by the *shurafa*.

I have put forward two models to explain socio-political life in rural areas: the *leff* system and the model of segmentary opposition. The model of segmentary opposition seems only partially appropriate to the Moroccan situation. It is based on descent and, according to segmentation theory, tribes consist of descent groups. But, in Morocco other criteria than descent are equally valid. Adoption of new members frequently occurs and we have seen that 'closeness' can be another important factor for the constitution of rural 'communities'.

Balance of power between the different social groups was the keyword in 19th century politics, as the study of Laroui has shown. The sultan had to achieve this balance through the *bay'a* and by forging coalitions (e.g. with certain tribes against other tribes).

The main forces of change came after the battles of Isly (1844) and the Tetouan wars (1859-60), in which the Moroccan forces were defeated. There was an urgent need for military and administrative reforms. As elsewhere in the developing world, the government began to depend on foreign loans. And this meant debts. The first loan was concluded in 1902 with France, which marked the beginning of an increasing dependence on the European powers and especially on France. What followed was a series of developments, that would ultimately lead to the protectorate: the convention of Algieras in 1906, in which a state bank was formed and a program of reform formulated, the signing of this convention by sultan Abd al-Hafiz in 1910, the ensuing rebellion and the crushing of this insurrection by French troops.

The installation of the protectorate meant the take-over of the military and administrative system in the most important parts of the country (i.e. controlled by the *makhzan*).

Concerning the rural policy of the French, one should observe the legal manoeuvring of the French to favour the French colons. Through a series of progressive legal manoeuvres huge parts of land were used for agricultural colonization, private property was introduced and these measures have resulted in the breakdown of the tribal system. At the same time, the French imposed restrictions on the *jama'a* (*dahir* of April 26 1919) and 'reformed' Berber customary law.

As a result of these developments most of the tribes have become a 'landless, anomic, rural proletariat' as Vinogradov concluded concerning the Ait Ndhir (Vinogradov 1974). Became.

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- 1 The makhzan in the 19th century was some kind of bureaucracy that stood at the disposal of the sultan. It consisted of an extension of the royal court, the army and a rural administration. (Burke: 12)
 - 2 Hoffman (1967) distinguishes six basic units of social organization in rural Morocco: the nuclear family, the extended family, the minor lineage, the major lineage or commune, the district and the tribe. The minor lineage is a lineage where a common ancestor is at a distance of 6 to 8 generations. This is the largest group that is based on blood alone. At higher levels immigrant elements are quite common. For instance, the minor lineages, which form part of a major lineage, are usually not related to each other.
 - 3 Zāwiya can refer to a Sufi lodge or a school (in pre-colonial times).
 - 4 Especially Sultan Hassan I (reigned: 1873-1894) is renowned for his many expeditions into rural areas. In this way, he attempted to bring even the most remote areas under control of the makhzan. It was mainly a military column (ḥarka), which could amount to 50.000 men, not counting the court officials, traders, suppliers, wives and concubines.
 - 5 Promotion was contingent on loyalty, achievement and family ties. Nevertheless, during the reigns of sultans Muhammad IV and Hassan I structural reforms were introduced based on innovations in the Ottoman reform program (tanzimat). "Ministers were salaried and the

top levels of government were organized into formal bureaus.” (Miller, ebook, pp. 14 of 64)

6 Jaish means 'army' in Arabic. Guish (the French name for jaish) tribes are Arab tribes that served as soldiers for the sultan since 1188.

7 During the Agadir crisis tension between France and Germany increased as a result of the deployment of French troops in the interior of Morocco. Germany reacted by sending the gunboat SMS Panther to Agadir, on 1 July. As a result of the treaty of Fes Germany recognized French protectorate in Morocco, receiving in return territories in the French colony of Middle Congo. Spain gained a zone of influence in Northern Morocco. (source: Wikipedia.org).

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